We explore the interplay of market structure and government trade policy in the context of a heterogenous goods duopoly model (allowing for goods to be substitutes or complements) wherein governments simultaneously and noncooperatively choose whether or not to provide subsidies for their firms and then firms noncooperatively choose output levels, either sequentially (i.e., in a Stackelberg leader-follower model) or simultaneously (i.e., in a Cournot-Nash model). We focus on competition in quantities but also provide results when firms compete in prices. In both the quantity and price models we further allow for endogenous market structure by considering two game forms wherein one of the firms, a potential leader, can choose to lead or not lead (play Cournot).
ABSTRACT
We explore the interplay of market structure and government trade policy in the context of a heterogenous goods duopoly model (allowing for goods to be substitutes or complements) wherein governments simultaneously and noncooperatively choose whether or not to provide subsidies for their firms and then firms noncooperatively choose output levels, either sequentially (i.e., in a Stackelberg leader-follower model) or simultaneously (i.e., in a Cournot-Nash model). We focus on competition in quantities but also provide results when firms compete in prices. In both the quantity and price models we further allow for endogenous market structure by considering two game forms wherein one of the firms, a potential leader, can choose to lead or not lead (play Cournot).
We find that government trade policy and market structure can interact. First, the trade regime can alter traditional firm preferences over sequential versus simultaneous play. Second, different market structures can influence governments' preferences about free trade versus subsidies. Further, if one of the firms is a potential leader, allowing for endogenous market structure generates equilibrium outcomes that sometime reinforce, and sometimes counter, received results in the extant strategic trade literature. For example, when firms compete in quantities, endogenous market structure results in Cournot-Nash competition, but competition in prices results in a leader-follower structure.
Introduction
Much of the extant literature on strategic international trade takes market structure as given, but it would not be surprising that government trade policies might influence the market structure that arises in equilibrium, 1 nor might it be surprising that different market structures may influence the efficacy of alternative government trade policies. Thus, in this paper we re-examine some issues in industrial organization and strategic international trade that were first addressed in the mid-1980s
and stimulated the development of extensive related literatures. The relevant industrial organization literature focused on firms' preferences over sequential versus simultaneous play in markets (see, e.g., Gal-Or, 1985 and Dowrick, 1986) . A variety of endogenous timing models have been devised to rationalize asymmetry in behavior as an equilibrium outcome (see, for example, Boyer and Moreaux, 1987; Gal-Or, 1987; Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990; Robson, 1990; Mailath, 1993; Daughety and Reinganum, 1994; Sadanand and Sadanand, 1996; Amir and Grilo, 1999; and van Damme and Hurkens, 1999) . This literature generally ignores the role of governments and thus no consideration of taxes or subsidies is involved. In contrast, the relevant strategic international trade literature focused on a two-stage model in which governments first chose tax or subsidy rates and subsequently their domestic firms simultaneously chose output or price strategies in a third-country market (see, e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1985, and Grossman and Eaton, 1986, respectively) , in part in order to determine circumstances under which governments would prefer free trade. Since these seminal papers were written, many variations have been considered; see Brander (1995) for a recent survey.
For instance, papers addressing variations in the timing of moves include Carmichael (1987) and Gruenspecht (1988) , in which the firms move before the governments; and Arvan (1991) and Hwang and Schulman (1993) , in which the governments may move sequentially, but the firms are CournotNash players. Dixit (1984) varies the number of firms, and places the competing firms in a "reciprocal-markets" context (as opposed to the "third-market" context). Driskill and McCafferty (1989) provide a dynamic version of Eaton and Grossman's model. However, to our knowledge, no
one has yet considered the case wherein the two governments first choose tax or subsidy rates and subsequently their domestic firms sequentially choose their strategies. Our contribution is to fill this gap and to demonstrate how the possibility of sequential timing of firms' decisions impacts both the industrial organization results on role preferences and the strategic international trade results on governments' preferences for free trade.
Assuming that the firms compete in quantity strategies, we find that, in a regime of subsidies, firms' preferences over roles are completely reversed from their preferences under free trade (those found in the industrial organization literature) when the goods are substitutes. When the goods are complements, the reversals are partial, and they differ for firms and their respective governments.
We also find that firms' and their governments' preferences over trade regime can, but need not, be affected by the timing of output choice in the market. In particular, when the goods are complements, both firms and both governments prefer a regime of subsidies independent of the timing of output choice. The case of substitute goods is more complicated: when the market is simultaneous, firms prefer a regime of subsidies while their governments prefer free trade. However, free trade is not a Nash equilibrium for the governments; subsidization is a dominant strategy for each government. This is the familiar "prisoners' dilemma" outcome, which the governments can remedy by using trigger strategies in repeated interactions to support the free trade outcome.
However, we find that when the market is sequential, the leader firm and its government prefer free trade while the follower firm and its government prefer a regime of subsidies. Thus, the governments disagree about the desirability of free trade. Moreover, it is a dominant strategy for the leader firm's government to neither tax nor subsidize its domestic firm, so there is no credible punishment strategy to which this government can revert in order to support its desired outcome of free trade. Thus, reliance on repeated game arguments to achieve free trade are not robust to variations in market structure. One further implication of this is that a government whose domestic firms are often Stackelberg leaders in markets will extol the virtues of free trade to its domestic firms (i.e., refuse to subsidize them), while exerting little effort to prevent the foreign government from subsidizing its firm (in the case of complements) or exerting effort but having little success (in the case of substitutes). In order to sustain a free trade outcome in the case of substitutes, the governments might make trade agreements that involve multiple markets, but this would require that
(1) a government whose firm is a follower in some markets is also a leader in other markets; and (2) the gains from free trade in those markets in which each firm is a leader must offset the losses from free trade in those markets in which each firm is a follower.
We take the analysis further, allowing for the market structure itself to be endogenously determined. Thus, the presence of alternative government strategies with respect to trade turns out to influence the market structure in which the firms will compete. In particular, if a firm that is able to exert a leadership position can choose not to assume that role (that is, it can choose to "play Cournot" instead), then the resulting market structure is Cournot-Nash, not Stackelberg. Thus, the early results in the trade literature, which assumed Cournot-Nash market structure, turn out to be remarkably robust. This fails to be true if firms compete in prices rather than in quantities (both analyses assume heterogeneous goods); now sequentiality becomes the robust outcome.
There are two more strands of the IO literature which are related to this paper. First, there is a small literature on the choice of strategy space; see Singh and Vives (1984) and Klemperer and Meyer (1986) . We will assume the strategy space is fixed (e.g., by technology or tradition), but this is clearly a possible direction of extension. Second, strategic trade models are multi-stage games, usually with the governments playing first and the firms playing second (engaging in market competition). In a related literature from IO (called the "delegation" literature), owners move first, followed by managers moving second. Owners design incentive contracts under which their respective managers subsequently compete in the market (see, e.g., Vickers, 1984; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; and Sklivas, 1987) . As has been true of the strategic trade literature, the nature of the incentive contract changes as a function of the strategy space used by the managers.
There has been a partial convergence of these two literatures. In a recent paper, Miller and Pazgal (forthcoming) show that, if the owners can employ sufficiently general incentive schemes, then the equilibrium market outcome will be independent of the strategy space in which the managers compete (i.e., they can both choose prices, or both choose quantities, or one can choose price while the other chooses quantity). For the case of linear demand and constant marginal costs, a linear combination of own profits and rival profits is sufficient to obtain this independence result.
However, they also show that a linear combination of own profits and own output is not sufficient for this equivalence result to hold. The implication for the strategic trade literature is that the strategy space will continue to be important because the objective function for the firm is of the second, not the first, form, since it consists of own profits plus the subsidy rate times own output.
Considering government policies that incorporate own and foreign profits and outputs may be a source of yet further extension, but this is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Plan of the Paper
In Section 2, we define notation and describe the model to be used in the remainder of the paper. In Sections 3 and 4, we reiterate the findings from the industrial organization literature on firms' preferences over roles, and from the strategic trade literature on firms' and governments' preferences over the trade regime, respectively. In Section 5, we solve the game wherein the governments first choose subsidy rates simultaneously and noncooperatively, and the firms then compete through a sequential choice of output levels. In Section 6 we compare these results with those of Sections 3 and 4, emphasizing the impact of trade regime on role preferences and the impact of market structure on preferences over trade regimes. In Section 7, we re-examine these issues under the assumption that a potential leader firm can choose to lead or to play Cournot-Nash (i.e., a firm with the opportunity to move first can choose to defer its choice and move simultaneously), though a Cournot-Nash firm or a follower firm are stuck with their roles. Section 8 reports results comparable to those of Section 6 assuming the firms use price strategies and again considers the endogenous determination of market structure discussed in Section 7. Finally, Section 9 summarizes and concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
The Model: Quantity Strategies
In this section, we describe the basic notation and common elements of the models to be examined in the remainder of the paper. We assume that two firms, each located in a different country, compete in a market which operates in a third country. For simplicity, we will confine ourselves to the case of linear demand and constant marginal costs, but we will note where the results hold more generally.
Let p i (q 1 , q 2 ) = a -bq i -dq j represent the inverse demand function for good i, which is produced only by firm i, which is located in country i, We denote firm i's profitsby π i (q 1 , q 2 , s i ) = p i (q 1 , q 2 )q i -cq i + s i q i ; the firms' equilibrium output levels will depend upon the subsidy rates (s 1 , s 2 ). We will consider both a simultaneous and a sequential market structure. 
Solution of the Simultaneous and Sequential Market Games under Free Trade
We briefly present the solution of the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg games under free trade in order to illustrate the industrial organization issue: what is a firm's preference ordering over the roles of Stackelberg leader, Cournot-Nash player and Stackelberg follower? Since this issue was addressed in the industrial organization context, the potential impact of government subsidy policy was not incorporated. Key papers in this area include Gal-Or (1984) and Dowrick (1985) . Gal-Or found that Stackelberg leadership was advantageous when the two firms' strategies were strategic substitutes 2 and hence best-response functions sloped downward. On the other hand, Stackelberg leadership was disadvantageous when firms' strategies were strategic complements and hence bestresponse functions sloped upward. For example, when firms choose quantity strategies and the goods themselves are substitutes, this is a case of strategic substitutes; if we change one aspect alone (e.g., quantity strategies with complementary goods, or price strategies with substitute goods), then this becomes a case of strategic complements. Dowrick extended the preference ordering to include Cournot-Nash play, and found that firms' preference orderings were as follows (restricting consideration to the case wherein firms produce goods that are substitutes): when the firms' strategies were strategic substitutes, then Stackelberg leadership was preferred to Cournot-Nash play, which was preferred to Stackelberg followership. On the other hand, when the firms' strategies were strategic complements, then Stackelberg followership was preferred to Stackelberg leadership, which was preferred to Cournot-Nash play. In this latter case, both firms agree that sequential play is preferred to simultaneous play, but they disagree over roles.
Given the basic model and notation described in Section 2, it is straightforward to verify that these relationships hold for our model with quantity strategies, and we present the results here only Table 1 below provides a summary of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output levels, profits and governmental payoffs. 
As shown in Table 1 , under free trade, government i's payoff is the same as firm i's profit.
Now consider the sequential market game in which firm 1 is arbitrarily designated the Stackelberg leader. Profits for firm 2 (the Stackelberg follower) are given by π 2 (q 1 , q 2 , 0) = (a -bq 2 -dq 1 )q 2 -cq 2 . As before, firm 2's best response function is given by BR 2 (q 2 , 0) = (a -c -dq 1 )/2b. Table 2 below provides the Stackelberg equilibrium output levels, profits and governmental payoffs under free trade when firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower. 
Again, under free trade, payoffs to a government and its firm are the same.
It is now straightforward to verify that:
(1) for the case of strategic substitutes, Π 
Solution of the Subsidy Regime Game under Simultaneous Markets
In this section, we briefly present the solution of our model when governments simultaneously choose subsidy rates and subsequently their respective domestic firms simultaneously choose quantity strategies; thus, this section provides the standard results initially developed and explored by Brander and Spencer (1985) . Market competition is assumed, for simplicity, to occur in a third country, so the governments' objective functions can be identified with domestic firm profits minus the amount of subsidies paid. Brander and Spencer (1985) found that, while unilateral subsidy was advantageous to a government, when both governments engaged in subsidy policies the equilibrium subsidies were positive but both governments were ultimately worse off. That is, while both governments preferred the free trade outcome to the bilateral subsidy outcome, subsidizing one's domestic firm was a dominant strategy. This prisoners' dilemma could be solved by using trigger strategies in which each government would abstain from subsidizing its domestic firm as long as the other government adhered to this same policy; however, any defection from free trade would be met with retaliatory defection, resulting in the bilateral subsidy outcome throughout the indefinite future. Again, given the basic model and notation described in Section 2, it is straightforward to verify that these results hold for our model with quantity strategies, and we present the results here only for purposes of comparison with what is to come; the model and results are well-known in the strategic international trade area.
First consider the simultaneous market game, with arbitrary subsidy rates (s 1 , s 2 ). Profits for firm i are given by π i (q 1 , q 2 , s i ) = (a -bq i -dq j )q i -cq i + s i q i , i = 1,2. Firm i's best response function is given by BR i (q j , s i ) = (a -c + s i -dq j )/2b, i = 1,2. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is symmetric with output levels, profits and governmental payoffs (for arbitrary subsidies of (s 1 , s 2 ))
as shown in Table 3 below. 
Differentiating w i CN (s 1 , s 2 ) with respect to s i , invoking symmetry (s 1 CN = s 2 CN ) and solving
. Substituting this into the results displayed in Table 3 above yields Table 4 below which provides the reduced form equilibrium outputs, profits and government payoffs when the equilibrium subsidies are used.
3 This approach to modeling oligopoly behavior in a static setting is not uncontroversial; see Daughety (1985) and Makowski (1987) . when the goods are complements).
Solution of the Subsidy Regime Game under Sequential Markets
To our knowledge, this version of this game has not been addressed in the previous literature.
Eaton and Grossman (1986) come closest when they consider a simultaneous-move market under the hypothesis of "consistent conjectures;" that is, they assume that each firm's conjectural variation parameter is equal to the slope of the rival firm's best-response function. is not a Nash equilibrium among the governments. Although the government of the Stackelberg leader firm neither taxes nor subsidizes its firm, the follower firm's government (in our quantity model) does subsidize its firm; this is sometimes advantageous and sometimes disadvantageous for the leader firm's government. We will provide the solution for the model with a sequential market structure and then compare it with the outcomes obtained in Sections 3 and 4 above.
For arbitrary subsidies (s 1 , s 2 ), consider the sequential market game in which firm 1 is arbitrarily designated the Stackelberg leader. Profits for firm 2 (the Stackelberg follower) are given by π 2 (q 1 , q 2 , s 2 ) = (a -bq 2 -dq 1 )q 2 -cq 2 + s 2 q 2 . Firm 2's best response function is given by BR 2 (q 2 , s 2 ) = (a -c + s 2 -dq 1 )/2b. Thus, π 1 (q 1 , BR 2 (q 1 , s 2 ), s 1 ) = (a -bq 1 -d(a -c + s 2 -dq 1 )/2b))q 1 -cq 1 + s 1 q 1 .
The Stackelberg equilibrium output levels, firm profits and government payoffs when firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower are shown in Table 5 below.
4 This result is quite general; it holds for substitutes and complements, quantity and price strategies, and arbitrary demand and cost functions (as long as the first-order conditions characterize the optima and second-order conditions hold with strict inequalities). Note that now the governments' payoffs differ from those of their domestic firms, because government welfare is domestic firm profits minus subsidies paid. Setting the derivative of w 1 L (s 1 , s 2 ) with respect to s 1 equal to zero and simplifying yields the first-order condition: -2bs 1 = 0 for all s 2 . Thus, we find that it is a dominant strategy for a government to neither tax nor subsidize its domestic firm when that firm is a Stackelberg leader in the product market.
4
The intuition behind this result is as follows. 
2 ). Since |d| < b and a > c, it follows that each term in this expression is positive. Thus, regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements, the follower firm's government will subsidize its production.
Substituting the equilibrium subsidy levels into Table 5 yields Table 6 which provides equilibrium quantities, profits and government payoffs when equilibrium subsidies are employed. 
A little algebra shows that, in a regime of equilibrium subsidies, the Stackelberg leader's output level is less than that of the Stackelberg follower. This is in contrast to the case under free trade, in which the Stackelberg leader produces more than the Stackelberg follower. The Stackelberg leader's incentive to produce more than the follower in the usual (equal marginal cost) case is overwhelmed by the cost advantage enjoyed by the follower whose production is subsidized (while that of the leader is not).
We can now determine the firms' and their governments' preference orderings over roles (Stackelberg leader versus Cournot-Nash player versus Stackelberg follower) and over free trade versus a regime of subsidies. First, consider firm preferences over roles. It can be shown that π
; that is, Stackelberg leadership is strongly disadvantageous in a regime of subsidies.
For both substitutes and complements, the Cournot-Nash profits are in between those of the leader and follower. Moreover, as was true of the output levels, the follower's profit exceeds the leader's profit. Further note that these results hold independent of the sign of d (that is, for substitutes as well as complements). Next, consider government preferences over roles. It can be shown that w substitutes. In the case of substitutes, the government's payoff under a simultaneous market structure is between those when its domestic firm is follower and leader, respectively; in the case of complements, the government least prefers the simultaneous market structure. We summarize these results in Proposition 1 (see the Appendix for the proof).
Proposition 1:
(a) π 
Comparisons
We now collect the standard results reiterated in Sections 3 and 4, and the new results generated in Section 5, into a pair of summary tables, that allow us to address the following questions: (1) What is the impact of allowing subsidies (as compared to free trade) on firm and government preferences over firm roles? (2) What is the impact of a sequential market structure (as compared to a simultaneous market structure) on firm and government preferences over free trade versus a subsidy regime? 
Under free trade, we recover the standard preference ordering over roles found in the industrial organization literature; moreover, since the government payoffs are the same as the firm profits, the governments share the preferences of their domestic firms. When the goods are complements, a firm prefers the role of Stackelberg follower to the role of Stackelberg leader, which is preferred to the role of Cournot-Nash player. That is, Stackelberg follower profits exceed Stackelberg leader profits, which exceed Cournot-Nash profits. In this latter case, both firms agree that the sequential structure is preferred to the simultaneous one, but each firm prefers to be the follower rather than the leader. When the goods are substitutes, a firm prefers the role of Stackelberg leader to the role of Cournot-Nash player, which is preferred to the role of Stackelberg follower.
That is, Stackelberg leader profits exceed Cournot-Nash profits which exceed Stackelberg follower profits.
As shown in this paper, under a regime of subsidies, two key differences can arise. First, firms' preferences over roles may change. We find that a firm always (independent of whether the goods are substitutes or complements) prefers the role of Stackelberg follower to the role of CournotNash player, which is preferred to the role of Stackelberg leader. This preference ordering has changed from the free trade case, both for substitutes and complements. For complements, only the preferences between the Cournot-Nash role and the Stackelberg leader role are reversed; a firm still most prefers the role of Stackelberg follower. In this case, the firms now disagree about the desirability of the sequential structure versus the simultaneous one. For substitutes, the preference ordering is completely reversed from the free trade case.
Second, the payoffs of a government and its domestic firm may diverge, so it is possible that government preferences may differ from those of its domestic firm. We find that when the goods are complements, a government prefers (for its domestic firm) the role of Stackelberg leader to the role of Stackelberg follower, which is preferred to the role of Cournot-Nash player. In this case, the government and its domestic firm disagree, since the firm prefers the role of Stackelberg follower to the role of Cournot-Nash player, which is preferred to the role of Stackelberg leader. When the goods are substitutes, a government prefers (for its domestic firm) the role of Stackelberg follower to the role of Cournot-Nash firm, which is preferred to the role of Stackelberg leader. Thus, in this case, the government and its domestic firm continue to agree in their preferences regarding the firm's role (but these preferences are completely reversed relative to the free trade case).
To address the second question, we refer to is listed along the left-hand-side and the two possible market structures are listed across the top. 
Under a Cournot-Nash market structure, we find the usual results from strategic trade theory.
Firms always prefer a regime of subsidies; governments prefer a regime of subsidies when the goods are complements, but prefer free trade when the goods are substitutes. Thus, when the goods are complements, both firms and both governments agree that a regime of subsidies is preferable to free trade. However, when the goods are substitutes, the firms and their respective governments will disagree about the desirability of free trade, with the governments preferring free trade. Although subsidizing is a dominant strategy in a one-shot game, it is clear that the governments could resolve this prisoners' dilemma using trigger strategies that rely on behavior only in the instant market (since each government can punish the other government by reverting to subsidizing its firm).
When the market structure involves sequential timing, we find that a government and its domestic firm will never be in conflict about the desirability of free trade. When the goods are complements, both firms and their governments prefer a regime of subsidies (as they do in the simultaneous-market case). When the goods are substitutes, profits for a Stackelberg leader (and its government's payoff) are higher under free trade than in a regime of subsidies; however, profits for a Stackelberg follower (and its government's payoff) are lower under free trade than in a regime of subsidies. In this case (and in contrast to the simultaneous-market case), the two governments do not agree on the desirability of free trade. Moreover, we found that it was a dominant strategy for the government of the Stackelberg leader firm to offer a subsidy of zero even in a subsidy regime.
Thus, in trying to maintain a regime of free trade, the government of the leader firm cannot use a strategy of reverting to the subsidy regime in order to punish the government of the follower firm (since a subsidy of zero is the leader's government's optimal strategy in both regimes). Any sort of trigger strategy policy must link across different markets, where the leader in some markets is a follower in others. Then a deviation from free trade by government i in a market wherein firm j is a leader can be punished by a deviation from free trade by government j in a market wherein firm i is a leader. In the Appendix we provide a proof of Proposition 3. That is, if there are two "third-country markets" in which the firms compete, with each being a leader in one market and a follower in the other, then both governments would prefer (and could support) a regime of free trade by using trigger strategies of the form: do not subsidize in either market unless the other government has subsidized in some market; if the other government has subsidized in some market, then revert to subsidizing in the market in which your domestic firm is a follower (since it is a dominant strategy to neither tax nor subsidize in the market in which your domestic firm is a leader).
One final observation to be made about the basic model with quantity strategies, in which market structure is exogenously-specified, is that government trade policy can be determined both by the nature of the goods and the market structure. If the goods are substitutes and the firms move simultaneously, then both governments will engage in free trade (e.g., supported by trigger strategies); if the goods are substitutes and the firms move sequentially, then the governments will disagree about the desirability of free trade, and hence it will be unsustainable; the governments will end up in a subsidy regime. In the case of complementary goods, the governments are always unified in their preference for the subsidy regime, independent of the market structure.
Endogenous Role Choice
We have heretofore assumed that the firms' roles as Stackelberg leader and follower were exogenous, or dictated by considerations outside of this particular market. For instance, if firm 1 invents a new product for sale in the third country, then it may anticipate that once it enters, firm 2 may imitate the product and enter the market as well. Essentially, if firm 1 wants to enter the market, it may have to assume the role of Stackelberg leader. On the other hand, one might imagine circumstances under which a firm which has the option to be a Stackelberg leader might be able to defer its decision in order to effect a Cournot (simultaneous-move) market structure. We consider this possibility in this section, under two different game forms. In both scenarios, however, we assume that the other firm cannot choose the timing of its moves; if the firm with the option to move first exercises this option, then the market structure will be a Stackelberg leader-follower one, while if the firm with the option to move first chooses not to exercise this option, then the market structure will be a Cournot one. In terms of the governments' choices, we consider a single third-country market, so that multi-market trigger strategies (of the sort discussed in Section 6) may not be invoked to support free trade. However, if both governments would prefer free trade to a regime of bilateral subsidies, then trigger strategies based on this single market could be used to support free trade, and we will allow this level of coordination by the governments.
The game forms we consider are as follows. First, the potential leader (say, firm 1) decides, once and for all, upon its role: "Leader" or "Cournot." Then the governments choose their subsidy levels, and finally the firms choose their output levels (in sequence if firm 1 has chosen Leader and simultaneously if firm 1 has chosen Cournot). The second and third stages may be viewed as being repeated infinitely often, so the governments may use trigger strategies to support free trade if they both prefer this outcome to that under a regime of bilateral subsidies. This would be an appropriate model if role choice involves choosing a level of capacity that will remain fixed for a long period of time, or signing long-term contracts with input suppliers or buyers. We will refer to this game form as "market structure first" or MSF.
The second game form involves the governments choosing their subsidy levels first, followed by a choice of role by firm 1, and then by output choices on the part of the firms. In this case, all three stages may be viewed as being repeated infinitely often, so that the governments may use trigger strategies to sustain free trade if this is the outcome they both prefer. This would be an appropriate model if role choice does not involve a long-lasting commitment. We will refer to this case as "subsidy policy first" or SPF. ; see Table 8 ). We assume that this is sustainable through trigger strategies. Thus, firm Proposition 4 summarizes the equilibrium for this game form.
Proposition 4: In the MSF game form, the potential leader will choose the Cournot role; the governments will choose free trade when the products are substitutes and bilateral subsidies when the products are complements.
Since market structure is endogenous in this game form, the equilibrium trade regime depends only on the nature of the goods; independent of the nature of the goods, the Leader defers its decision in order to effect the Cournot-Nash market structure.
Next we consider the second game form, SPF, wherein the governments first choose free trade or to employ subsidies. Regardless of the type of goods, if the governments choose free trade, then firm 1 will choose the role of Leader (since Π L * > Π CN * for both substitutes and complements; see Table 7 ). In this case, the governments will anticipate the payoffs (w Proposition 5. In the SPF game form the governments will always choose bilateral subsidies and the potential leader will always choose the Cournot role.
In the case of complements, both governments prefer the regime of bilateral subsidies, while in the case of substitutes, government 1 would prefer free trade while government 2 would prefer to subsidize. It is firm 1's behavioral response to free trade (it chooses the Leader role in response to free trade) which makes it impossible for government 1 to engage government 2 in support of free trade (even for substitute goods, as occurred in the MSF game form): if firm 1 were to choose the Cournot role in response to free trade, then both governments would prefer free trade. Thus, the domestic firm's behavior can de-stabilize a free trade agreement that is potentially beneficial to the two governments. To summarize, in both game forms, the simultaneous market structure turns out to be the robust outcome; only in the MSF game form with substitute goods does the free trade regime arise in equilibrium.
Summary of Results When Price is the Strategic Market Variable
Here we briefly summarize the analogous results to those of Section 6 and 7 for the case in which firms compete in price strategies; details can be found in Balboa (in progress), wherein a result analogous to that shown in Section 5 is proved: both governments tax their firms when the market structure is simultaneous (that is, s CN < 0); when the market structure is sequential, the leader's government neither taxes nor subsidizes its firm, while the follower's government taxes its firm. Table 9 summarizes the firms' and their governments' preferences over market structure, given the trade regime. For linguistic convenience in the comparisons that will be made below, we will continue to refer to a regime of subsidies, and simply interpret a tax as a negative subsidy. Tables 7 and 9 ). However, this is not the case under a regime of subsidies; while the same conversion works for the governments' payoffs, the firms' payoffs are affected differently because their governments apply different subsidy rates (s L = 0 for the leader's government and s F < 0 for the follower's government), and thus they compete with different effective marginal costs, when the market structure is sequential. Using quantity strategies, the relevant preference ordering is π given the market structure. Under a sequential market structure, this conversion is further disrupted; while it is supported for the leader firm and its government (who have identical payoffs because s L = 0), it is not supported for the follower firm or for the follower firm's government. Rather than supporting the usual crossidentification between outcomes under strategic substitutes versus strategic complements, switching from quantity strategies to price strategies simply reverses every inequality in Table 8 (note, however, that Table 9 does not simply reverse every inequality in Table 7 ).
When market structure is exogenously given, then Table 10 implies that the equilibrium trade regime will involve subsidies when the goods are substitutes and free trade when the goods are complements, independent of the market structure. This is in contrast to the case of quantity strategies, wherein the market structure could affect the resulting trade regime.
When market structure is endogenized using either the MSF or SPF game forms introduced earlier, we find that both the equilibrium market structure and the equilibrium trade regime are independent of the game form: for both game forms, the potential leader chooses the Leader role and the governments choose the subsidy regime if the goods are substitutes and free trade if the goods are complements. Thus, now it is a sequential market structure that is the robust outcome when the firms compete in price strategies, while the trade regime depends upon whether the goods are substitutes or complements. Unlike the quantity model, however, neither the market structure nor the trade regime depends upon the game form used to model endogenous market structure.
Conclusions
In this paper we explored the interplay of market structure and government trade policy. We did this primarily in the context of a heterogenous goods duopoly model wherein governments first (noncooperatively) choose whether or not to provide subsidies for their firms and then firms choose output levels, either sequentially (i.e., in a Stackelberg leader-follower model) or simultaneously (i.e., in a Cournot-Nash model). We also provided results when firms compete in prices (which means that equilibrium government subsidies are negative, that is, taxes). In both the quantity and price models we further allowed for endogenous market structure by considering two game forms wherein one of the firms, a potential leader, can choose to lead or not lead (play Cournot). for free trade and S for a subsidy regime, as a triple: (under exogenous market structure, under game form MSF, under game form SPF). A dash means that the indicated market structure (play is simultaneous or sequential) does not arise endogenously in equilibrium for the specified strategy space (strategies are in quantities or in prices) and the specified demand structure (goods are substitutes or complements). Finally, an asterisk on a trade regime means that at least one government in the associated equilibrium sets its subsidy to zero. The importance of this last point is that while both governments set subsidies to zero under free trade, the government of a leader firm also picks a subsidy (a tax in the case of competition in prices) of zero in the subsidy regime. influenced by the nature of the goods (i.e., substitutes or complements) and not the market structure (simultaneous or sequential). Moreover, when a potential leader exists and market structure can be endogenously determined, then the outcome always involves sequential play, independent of the nature of the goods.
This clean separation of trade regime and market structure does not arise when firms compete in quantities. There, endogenous market structure results in simultaneous play. One reason is that leadership for a firm can be distinctly disadvantageous and the government of a follower firm can not be restrained by the leader's government from using subsidies, making the follower firm's production costs effectively lower than the leader's. This acts as an out-of-equilibrium threat which induces a potential leader to opt out from leading when this choice is available.
= 1024(1 -t 2 ) 2 > 0 for t ∈ (0, 1). The expression h 2 (t) = 128 -192t 2 + 88t 4 has h 2 (0) = 128 and h 2 ′(t) = -384t + 352t 2 < 0. Thus, h 2 (t) starts at 128 and decreases over the interval t ∈ (0, 1); since it is still positive at t = 1, where h 2 (1) = 24, it follows that h 2 (t) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1). The expression h 3 (t) is clearly positive for all t ∈ (0, 1). Finally, the expression h 4 (t) has h 4 (0) = 34 and h 4 ′(t) = -12 + 2t < 0. Thus, h 4 (t) starts at 34 and decreases over the interval t ∈ (0, 1); since it is still positive at t = 1, where h 4 (1) = 23, it follows that h 4 (t) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1). Combining these results implies that g 2 (t) = h 1 (t) + t 3 h 2 (t) + t 4 h 3 (t) + t 8 h 4 (t) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1).
For t ∈ (-1, 0), g 2 (t) can again be written as a combination of four expressions, each of which is itself positive for t ∈ (-1, 0) (however, these are different expressions): g 2 (t) = h 5 (t) + h 6 (t) + t 4 h 7 (t) + t 4 h 8 (t), where h 5 (t) = 896 -2048t 2 + 1175t 4 , h 6 (t) = 128 + 128t (-1, 0), write g 3 (t) = {16 -4t 2 } -t{16 -5t 2 }. Both expressions in curly brackets are positive and -t is positive for t ∈ (-1, 0). Hence g 3 (t) > 0 for t ∈ (-1, 0). Now consider t ∈ (0, 1). Since g 3 (0) > 0, g 3 (1) > 0 and g 3 ′(t) = -16 -8t + 15t 2 < 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1), it follows that g 3 (t) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, inequality (4) Claim 3. g 5 (t) = 256 -192t -352t 2 + 256t 3 + 152t 4 -104t 5 -22t 6 + 13t 7 > 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Claim 3: Since g 5 (0) = 256, g 5 (1) = 7 and g 5 ′(t) < 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1), it follows that g 5 (t) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1). To see that g 5 ′(t) < 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1), note that g 5 ′(t) = -192 -704t + 768t 2 + 608t 3 -520t 4 -132t 5 + 91t 6 . This can be written as a combination of three functions, each of which is itself negative for t ∈ (0, 1): g 5 ′(t) = h 9 (t) + th 10 (t) + t 5 h 11 (t), where h 9 (t) = -192 + 192t 2 -576t + 576t 2 , h 10 (t) = -126t + 608t 3 -520t 4 and h 11 (t) = -132 + 91t. It is clear that h 9 (t) < 0 and h 11 (t) < 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1). To see that h 10 (t) = -126t + 608t 3 -520t 4 < 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1), notice that h 10 (t) = -2t{63 -304t 2 + 260t 3 }= -2tH(t), where H(t) = 63 -304t 2 + 260t 3 > 0. To see this, note that H(0) = 63 and H(1) = 19. H′(t) = -608t + 720t 2 = 0 at t = 0 and t = 608/720, the latter of which provides a minimum of H(t) since H″(t) = [720t -608] + t720 > 0 at t = 608/720. Moreover, H(608/720) = 1.42984 > 0.
Thus H(t) > 0, which implies that h 10 (t) < 0, which implies that g 5 ′(t) < 0, which implies that g 5 (t) > 0, for all t ∈ (0, 1). QED: Claim 3. QED: Proposition 3. Claim 4. g 6 (t) = 32 -40t -8t 2 + 24t 3 -8t 4 + t 5 > 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Claim 4. Notice that g 6 (0) = 32 and g 6 (1) = 1. Moreover, g 6 (t) can be re-written as g 6 (t) = 8(1 -t 2 + t 3 -t 4 ) + h 12 (t), where h 12 (t) = 24 -40t + 16t 3 + t 5 . The expression in parentheses is positive, 
